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Abstract: 
This paper investigates the effects of inward FDI on per-capita income and growth 
of the US states since the mid-1970s. Using a Markov chain approach, it shows 
that both quantitative and qualitative characteristics of FDI affect per-capita 
income and growth. The empirical findings suggest that employment-intensive 
FDI, concentrated in richer states, has been conducive to income growth, while 
capital-intensive FDI, concentrated in poorer states, has not. Consequently, FDI 
has tended to be associated with weaker rather than stronger income convergence 
among US states. It appears to be less important whether FDI has been undertaken 
in the manufacturing sector of US states or in other sectors. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
The United States (US) hosted about 1.6 trillion US$ of inward foreign direct investment 
(FDI) stocks in 2005, which is only 20 percent less than the FDI stocks the US held abroad 
(UNCTAD 2006, p. 303). In terms of FDI inflows in 2003-2005, the US ranked at the top of 
all recipient countries (275 billion US$), followed by the United Kingdom and China. The US 
is also the most favored location for affiliates of the top 100 multinational companies 
(UNCTAD 2006, p. 34–35). Hence, it is fairly surprising that the economic impact of inward 
FDI in the US has received only scant attention in the literature, whereas the economic impact 
of inward FDI in less advanced economies such as China or India as well as its possible 
repercussions on advanced home countries has been investigated in a large number of studies.  
Empirical evidence is particularly scarce when it comes to the question whether inward FDI 
helps less advanced US regions to narrow the income gap to more advanced US regions 
(Torau and Goss 2004). This is again in striking contrast to less developed host countries such 
as China, where it has been shown that FDI inflows contributed to widening regional income 
disparities, rather than narrowing them (Mody and Wang 1997; Zhang and Zhang 2003; Xing 
and Zhang 2004). This neglect is rather surprising considering that, even if Washington, DC, 
is excluded, per-capita income differed by a factor of almost two in 2005 between the most 
and least advanced US states (Connecticut and Louisiana, respectively).  
US states compete aggressively for FDI, especially for new manufacturing plants (Head et al. 
1999; Torau and Goss 2004). Graham and Krugman (1995) observe that bidding between US 
states was fierce even at times when a flood of popular articles and books expressed concern 
that FDI would reduce employment, worsen the trade deficit and inhibit technological 
progress in the US.
1 Obviously, regional policymakers offering all sorts of incentives and 
outright subsidies to foreign investors work on a different assumption, namely that FDI 
inflows help improve income and employment prospects.
2  
The impact of FDI on regional growth in the US is theoretically ambiguous. Moreover, previ-
ous empirical studies on FDI-induced convergence (or divergence) across various host coun-
tries or within less advanced host countries offer only limited insights for the US. And the 
                                                 
1   Casey (1998) lists various state measures through which regional policymakers lured foreign investors. For 
instance, the state of Alabama is reported to have spent US$ 150,000 per job created to attract a new Mercedes 
plant in 1994 (Keller and Yeaple 2009). 
2   The Organization for International Investment, the business association representing the US subsidiaries of 
international companies, reckons that policymakers are right in promoting FDI and stresses FDI-induced 
employment generation at the state level; for details, see: http://www.ofii.org/insourcing/map/. By contrast, 
Leichenko and Erickson (1997) note that its minimal impact on regional employment has been one of the key 
criticisms of FDI in the US.   2
literature on location choice by foreign investors in the US provides at best indirect evidence 
on the growth effects of FDI at the state level.  
Hence, it is still open to debate whether competition for FDI among US states is just a “mad 
scramble for the crumbs” (Glickman and Woodward 1989). This paper contributes to this 
debate by assessing empirically the effects of inward FDI on per-capita income growth of US 
states since the mid-1970s. Using a Markov chain approach, the paper focuses on whether 
inward FDI helps poorer states catch up with richer states.  
It turns out that the effects of FDI on income growth depend not only on quantitative meas-
ures of the density of FDI, but also on qualitative characteristics of FDI. In particular, 
employment-intensive FDI is conducive to long-run income growth, while capital-intensive 
FDI is not. The probability of staying or becoming rich in the long run is significantly higher 
for US states that have received larger amounts of employment-intensive FDI. Since growth 
enhancing employment-intensive FDI is concentrated in richer states, FDI has tended to be 
associated with weaker rather than stonger income convergence among US states since the 
mid-1970s. These major findings are robust against variations of the empirical setup, and 
there is little evidence for reverse causality. 
The next section discusses the analytical background and the previous literature. Section 3 
describes the methodology and the data, Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 summa-
rizes and offers policy conclusions. The data and SAS code used for this paper are available at 
http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/15083. 
2  ANALYTICAL BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS FINDINGS 
FDI is widely regarded as a composite bundle of capital inflows, knowledge, and technology 
transfers (Balasubramanyam et al. 1996). Hence, the impact of FDI on growth is expected to 
be manifold (Romer 1993; De Mello 1997). FDI may complement local investment and can 
thus add to production capacity. In addition, FDI can promote growth through productivity 
gains resulting from spillovers to local firms. As noted by Borensztein et al. (1998), the rate of 
growth of host economies depends on the extent to which they adopt superior technologies 
over which multinational companies command. While technology can be diffused through 
various channels, FDI is considered a major mechanism through which host economies may 
access advanced technologies (see also Findlay 1978). Likewise, the managerial expertise and 
knowledge of multinational companies may spill over to local companies. This may promote 
growth by relaxing human capital constraints in the host economy. Taken together, FDI is 
supposed to help overcome various bottlenecks which the new growth theory considers 
essential to prevent returns to capital from decreasing. 
This reasoning is fairly common in the literature on the FDI-growth link across countries. 
Mullen and Williams (2005) argue that the role of FDI in stimulating regional growth is   3
similar to that in the national context. Girma and Wakelin (2001) offer several arguments why 
FDI should have a regional dimension. FDI-related spillovers, including demonstration 
effects, the acquisition of skills as well as technology transfers, are expected to benefit 
primarily the region where FDI is located. Accordingly, less advanced regions should have 
better chances to catch up economically to more advanced regions if they succeed to attract 
FDI. Alternatively, it may be suspected, however, that FDI-related spillovers are weaker in 
less advanced regions than in more advanced regions. FDI could rather widen regional 
disparities if less advanced regions lacked the absorptive capacity to benefit from spillovers. 
This argument resembles the development economics literature where it has been shown that 
too large a technological gap between the home and host country tends to compromise the 
growth effects of FDI in the host country.
3  
The theoretical predictions become still more ambiguous when assessing the role of FDI at 
the regional level of highly developed countries such as the US. For a start, the capital-
augmenting effect of FDI may be less relevant than in a developing country context.
4 Capital 
mobility within the US is considerably higher than that across countries, as US financial 
markets are well developed and the home bias of investors affects capital flows within the US 
to a lesser degree than capital flows in less developed countries.
5  
Additional ambiguity arises once it is taken into account that most theoretical discussions on 
the positive role of FDI in the host countries refer to the transmission of superior technology, 
taking it for granted that foreign-owned firms possess superior technology.
6 However, this 
assumption may not hold if foreign companies undertake FDI in a technologically most 
                                                 
3  See Mayer-Foulkes and Nunnenkamp (2009) and the references given there. Findlay (1978: 2) argues that the 
larger the gap in technology, the faster the transmission, provided that “the disparity must not be too wide for 
the thesis to hold”. Blomström and Kokko (1998) as well as Blomström et al. (2001) conclude from reviews of 
the literature that spillovers depend on the absorptive capacity of local firms, with small gaps encouraging 
spillovers and large gaps inhibiting them. 
4 The capital-augmenting effect of FDI in the US may also be constrained by the prominent role of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) (Bobonis and Shatz 2007). Unlike greenfield FDI, M&As amount to a change in ownership 
of existing production capacity. Nevertheless, M&As are not necessarily inferior to greenfield FDI. Both types 
of FDI may involve transfers of technology and managerial skills, and they may offer access to new foreign 
markets and sources of intermediate inputs. While the empirical evidence on the growth effects of different types 
of FDI is ambiguous, the findings of several studies suggest that advanced host countries such as the US tend to 
benefit from M&As (e.g., Conyon et al. 2002; Wang and Wong 2009). 
5 Barro et al. (1995) note that substantial borrowing and lending flows across US state borders. The assumption 
of a closed economy would thus be difficult to justify for US states (see also Mullen and Williams 2005). This 
is in contrast to Chinese provinces where factor market segmentation prevented the equalization of returns to 
capital and labor (Zhang and Zhang 2003). Yet, the model of Barro et al. (1995) implies that physical capital 
mobility tends to raise the rate of convergence only modestly unless human capital, too, is mobile. Francis et 
al. (2007) report evidence of a home bias of investments in the US which is primarily due to a lower 
effectiveness of external monitoring across larger geographical distances.  
6   According to Lipsey (2002, p. 34), “the benefits to the host country, if they exist, stem mainly from the 
superior efficiency of the foreign-owned operations.” Likewise, Girma and Wakelin (2001, p. 2) stress that the 
firm-specific assets that multinational companies are supposed to have provide the theoretical basis for the 
expectation of spillovers from foreign affiliates.   4
advanced country. Keller and Yeaple (2009) argue that the productivity of US firms is 
perhaps higher than in any other country of the world.
7 Hence, the US should attract a differ-
ent type of FDI than less developed host countries, namely an asset seeking rather than an 
asset exploiting type (Dunning 1999). Asset seeking FDI, which has also been termed tech-
nology or knowledge seeking FDI (Cantwell 1989), is motivated by the investing company’s 
search of knowledge and technologies that are not available in its home country. In other 
words, the investing company seeks to draw on superior knowledge and technologies, rather 
than transferring knowledge and technologies from which the host country may benefit 
through spillovers.
8  
The empirical investigation of Chung and Alcácer (2002) reveals that the bulk of manufac-
turing FDI in the US took place in lower-tech industries and was located in states with rela-
tively low R&D intensity. Yet, these authors provide evidence that asset seeking FDI has 
played a role in the US, though only in research-intensive industries. Moreover, they find that 
the asset seeking motive is not restricted to FDI from technically lagging source countries, but 
is also driving FDI from source countries that are similarly advanced as the US (see also 
Cantwell and Janne 1999). 
The focus of the empirical literature on FDI in the US is on location choice, i.e., the determi-
nants of FDI, rather than its effects on regional development.
9 If only implicitly, this strand of 
the literature tends to assume that FDI is an important mechanism to promote growth. For 
example, Friedman et al. (1996, p. 209) argue that policymakers wishing to foster economic 
development need to know about FDI determinants. As mentioned above, however, it cannot 
be taken for granted that a region attracting FDI will also derive benefits from it. Moreover, 
the relevant question in the present context is whether FDI-related benefits will go where they 
are needed most, i.e., to lagging US states trying to catch up with more advanced US states.  
The literature on FDI determinants may offer some indirect evidence on the regional distribu-
tion of FDI-related benefits. For example, empirical findings put into doubt earlier hopes that 
FDI would help revitalize and reindustrialize relatively poor regions in the US. This is even 
though Casey (1998) observed that foreign investors shifted their attention somewhat from 
large industrial states such as California, New York, Texas, New Jersey or Illinois towards 
south-eastern states (notably, North Carolina, Georgia and Tennessee) in the 1980s. Several 
studies suggest that FDI added to the concentration of industrial activity within the US by 
locating in relatively advanced states and where agglomeration economies could be reaped 
                                                 
7   Yet, Keller and Yeaple (2009) find FDI-related spillovers to be important for the US. The explanation they 
provide is that the relatively high average productivity of US firms masks a large amount of heterogeneity 
across US firms. 
8  Likewise, Mullen and Williams (2005) consider the possibility that foreign direct investors in the US may be 
more concerned with receiving technological spillovers from companies in the host region. 
9 In addition to studies mentioned in the text, examples of this strand of the literature include Hines (1996), 
Keller and Levinson (1999), as well as Coughlin and Segev (2000).   5
(Coughlin et al. 1991; Head et al. 1995; Friedman et al. 1996; Head et al. 1999; Bobonis and 
Shatz 2007). In this way, FDI may have contributed to the spatial density of economic activity 
which, according to Ciccone and Hall (1996), explains much of the variation of productivity 
across states. However, most studies focus on FDI in manufacturing and, thus, ignore the 
increasing role of FDI in services.
10 
By contrast, the effects of FDI on regional economic development in the US have received 
scant attention in the literature so far.
11 This is even though Greenstone and Moretti (2004) 
provide a most interesting analysis of the welfare implications of successfully bidding for 
large new plants at the county level. In contrast to Glickman and Woodward’s (1989) above 
noted verdict, these authors reject the view that the provision of subsidies to attract investors 
reduces local residents’ welfare. Their sample of 82 “Million Dollar Plants” includes foreign 
investors (notably automobile assemblers such as Volvo, BMW and Mercedes-Benz), but the 
sample clearly appears to be dominated by domestic US investors. Crain and Lee (1999) 
apply extreme-bounds analysis to assess the sensitivity of “numerous control variables” iden-
tified by earlier studies as potentially relevant to state economic performance: FDI is not con-
sidered at all! Apart from the aforementioned study of Torau and Goss (2004), we are aware 
of just one recent study specifically addressing the FDI-growth link at the level of US states:
12 
Mullen and Williams (2005) estimate a neoclassical model of conditional convergence 
(Mankiw et al. 1992), extended by the FDI density as an additional determinant of the steady 
state income. In a fixed effects panel regression for the 48 contiguous US states and four five-
year averages (1977–1997), they show different specifications of the FDI variable to have a 
significantly positive impact on income growth. This study suffers from implausible estimates 
for other model parameters, however. Most notably, the effect of population growth on per-
capita income growth is estimated to be significantly positive, whereas it should be negative 
according to the underlying neoclassical growth model. In addition, it is not taken into 
account that the growth effects may depend on the characteristics of FDI. Finally, the elastic-
                                                 
10 Bobonis and Shatz (2007) provide a major exception. As noted by these authors, the majority of FDI in the US 
is outside manufacturing. In terms of stocks, total manufacturing accounted for just about one third of overall 
FDI in the US in 2005 (BEA online data on historical cost basis). This is why we follow Bobonis and Shatz in 
considering FDI in all sectors in the following. However, we account for the sectoral structure of FDI and test 
whether the growth impact of FDI depends on the ratio of FDI in manufacturing to FDI in other sectors. 
11 For the United Kingdom, Girma and Wakelin (2001) find that (i) FDI-induced spillovers in the electronics 
industry are mostly confined to the region where FDI is located (possibly due to lower transport and 
communication costs within regions), and (ii) spillovers are stronger in more developed regions (possibly 
because less developed regions lack technological absorptive capacity). Taken together, this suggests that FDI 
may widen regional disparity. 
12 In addition, Feliciano and Lipsey (1999) use state and industry-wise FDI data to assess whether foreign-owned 
subsidiaries pay higher wages than US firms, which they find to be the case, though not in manufacturing. 
Leichenko and Erickson (1997) find that FDI was positively associated with US states’ export performance in 
1980–1991. In concluding, these authors note that it would be interesting to know whether favorable export 
effects translated into higher regional economic growth and, particularly, into growth in employment. Gelan et 
al. (2007) show that inward FDI has improved the relative employment opportunities of skilled black workers 
in the manufacturing sector and, thus, reduced racial employment disparity in the US, but they do not consider 
the regional dimension.   6
ity of income growth with respect to FDI may differ between states with low and high income 
levels, or between states with low and high FDI densities.  
3  APPROACH AND DATA 
The present paper complements studies using the convergence regression approach by 
employing the distribution dynamics approach to assess the relationship between FDI and the 
economic performance of US states.
13 The convergence regression approach is usually based 
on the concept of conditional β convergence, which is rooted in a Solowian model of exoge-
nous economic growth. This approach focuses on investigating the transition of a representa-
tive economy’s actual per-capita income level towards its individual steady state per-capita 
income level. In this context, FDI may be regarded as one factor that conditions an economy’s 
steady state income.  
In contrast, the distribution dynamics approach is based on the concept of σ convergence. It 
focuses on investigating the dynamics of the entire distribution of incomes across economies. 
Following Bickenbach and Bode (2003), we extend this approach to include FDI as a factor 
that conditions the evolution of the distribution of income across US states. By estimating a 
larger number of transition probabilities rather than a single regression parameter, we account 
for differences in the effects of FDI on income between economies with low and high income 
levels, or between economies with low and high FDI densities. 
Compared to the convergence regression approach, the distribution dynamics approach allows 
drawing inferences on a broader variety of issues related to the interplay between FDI and 
income growth (see below for details).
14 At the same time, the distribution dynamics approach 
straightforwardly concentrates on the variable of principal interest (here, FDI) and avoids 
imposing a restrictive functional form on the relationship between FDI and income growth. It 
is, however, not rooted explicitly in economic theory and does not establish unambiguously a 
causal relationship between FDI and income growth. It is nevertheless not necessarily inferior 
to the convergence regression approach in these respects. Causality is also an issue in the 
convergence regression approach, even if FDI is instrumented properly, because FDI is added 
in an ad hoc manner to convergence regression models rather than being derived consistently 
from the Solowian growth model.
15 We address endogeneity concerns at least tentatively in 
                                                 
13 Magrini (2004) and Durlauf et al. (2005), among others, provide extensive evaluations of convergence 
regression and distribution dynamics approaches.  
14 In convergence regressions, the elasticity of income growth with respect to FDI is often assumed to be the 
same for all host economies. For instance, Mullen and Williams (2005) estimate a single elasticity of income 
growth with respect to FDI, which they assume to be the same for all US states. This limitation could only be 
mitigated by interacting other explanatory variables in the convergence regressions, including initial-year 
income, with FDI terms or indicator variables that group together states with similar FDI densities. 
15 See Levine and Renelt (1992) and Levine and Zervos (1993) for a critical discussion of the robustness of 
control variables in convergence regressions.   7
the appendix by showing that states with higher initial per-capita income do not generally 
attract more (or less) FDI than those with lower per-capita income. 
This paper estimates separate Markov transition matrices for M subsamples of the 51 US 
states with differing FDI densities, and investigates to what extent the income growth and 
convergence behavior differs between these subsamples. Assuming that the distribution of 
per-capita income across US states follows a finite first-order Markov chain with stationary 
transition probabilities, and dividing the spectrum of possible per-capita incomes into N 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive income classes, the Markov chain for the mth subsample is 
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The transition matrix, Πm, reports, in each cell, the probability, pij|m, that a US state in the mth 
subsample will be in income class j at any time t+1, conditional on having been in income 
class i at time t. Starting from time 0, the income distribution will be hm(k)=hm(0)Πm
k after k 
transition periods. Provided the Markov chain is regular, this distribution converges to a lim-
iting (or “ergodic”) distribution, hm*, 
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which is independent of the initial distribution hm(0). A Markov chain is regular if, for some 
positive integer x, all entries of the matrix Π
x are positive. The limiting distribution maps the 
information contained in the (NxN) transition matrix into a single (1xN) vector. It character-
izes the steady state to which the distribution converges after a sufficient number of transition 
periods. Although the limiting distribution is purely hypothetical, it is frequently more infor-
mative than the transition matrix itself about the direction in which the income distribution is 
evolving during the sample period. The independence of the limiting distribution from the 
initial distribution is an important property in the context of the present paper (see below).   8
The transition matrices for the M subsamples of states with differing FDI intensities can be 
compared statistically by testing the hypothesis that they are equal to each other, i.e., H0: 
∀ m: pij|m = pij, m = 1, …, M,  i, j = 1, …, N.  pij denotes the probability of a transition from 
class i to class j in the US on aggregate. The (NxN) transition matrix Π = {pij} is estimated 
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(Anderson and Goodman 1957; Bickenbach and Bode 2003). The hats (^) in equation (4) 
indicate estimated values; nij|m denotes the absolute number of observed annual transitions 
from class i to class j within the m
th subsample; Ai|m the set of non-zero transition probabilities 
in the i
th row of the transition matrix for the m
th subsample, Πm; ai the number of non-zero 
transition probabilities in the i
th row of the transition matrix from the entire sample, Π; and bi 
the number of subsamples for which a positive number of empirical observations is available 
for the i
th row.  
The LR test in (4) will not reject the null hypothesis if all states with similar initial income 
levels exhibit, on aggregate, similar growth prospects irrespective of their FDI densities. In 
this case, we conclude that all states converge to the same limiting (steady-state) income dis-
tribution, i.e., h* = hm* ∀ m = 1, …, M.  h* denotes the limiting distribution for the entire 
sample of US states. This equality does not imply that all states have to grow at the same rate; 
richer states may still grow slower or faster than poorer states. It just implies that the FDI den-
sity makes no difference. The LR test will reject the null hypothesis, however, if states with 
similar initial income levels exhibit different growth prospects depending on their FDI densi-
ties. In this case, we conclude that the states converge to different limiting (steady-state) 
income distributions, i.e., hm* ≠ hm’*, m ≠ m’, for at least one pair of subsamples (m, m’).  
We draw three types of inferences from these estimates. First, comparing the limiting distri-
butions across the M subsamples indicates whether a higher or a lower FDI density is more 
conducive to income growth. If a higher FDI density is more conducive to income growth, the 
limiting distributions for the subsamples with higher FDI densities will exhibit higher prob-
abilities in high-income classes than those for the subsamples with lower FDI densities. The 
independence of the limiting from the initial distributions is important here. It allows drawing 
inferences on the differences between the subsamples in their steady-state income distribu-
tions that are independent of the actual income distributions. Second, we draw inferences 
from comparing the initial and limiting distributions of specific subsamples of states with 
similar FDI densities. This comparison indicates whether the subsample-specific income dis-
tributions tend to narrow or widen. And third, we compare these subsample-specific conver-
gence patterns to the aggregate, national convergence pattern. This comparison indicates   9
whether the convergence among states with similar FDI densities has been supportive of, or 
working against the convergence among all states.  
For the present purpose, the transition probabilities from time t to t+1, pij and pij|m, are esti-
mated from a panel of annual transitions of the logged relative per-capita personal income 
(PCPI) levels in the 51 US states over the period 1977 – 2005. The observed absolute per-
capita income by state is demeaned by the national average at each point in time to control for 
national inflation, business cycles, and global or national shocks. The 1,428 observed annual 
transitions (28 years from 1977 to 2004; 51 states) are divided into N = 6  equally  sized 
income classes such that the first income class comprises the 238 state-year observations with 
the lowest logged relative PCPI (≤ –0.20251), and the sixth income class the 238 state-year 
observations with the highest logged relative PCPI (> 0.088173). The mean per-capita income 
falls into the fourth class, which ranges from –0.06 to 0.010322. The observations for the final 
year of the transition, t+1, are divided into the same number of classes, using as upper bounds 
the upper bounds of the equally sized income classes for the initial year.  
In addition, we divide the total population of the 51 states into M = 3 subsamples according to 
their FDI density, such that the first subsample comprises the 17 states with the lowest FDI 
density, and the third subsample the 17 states with the highest FDI density. The upper bounds 
of these subsamples depend on the indicator of the FDI density, which will be specified 
below. These subsamples are defined according to the average of the states’ logged relative 
FDI densities in the first decade of the observation period (1977–1986). The states’ annual 
FDI densities are divided by the contemporary national FDI density to control for inflation, 
cycles, and common shocks. We use only the first decade of the sample period for classifying 
states according to their FDI density to capture the long-run effects of FDI on the evolution of 
the income distribution.
16 The period of ten years is sufficiently long to ensure that the empiri-
cal results are independent of random variations in, and shocks to the FDI density in single 
years.  
We measure the FDI density by two alternative quantitative indicators. The first indicator, 
subsequently labeled “density of FDI stocks”, emphasizes the monetary dimension of FDI, 
given by the value of gross property, plant and equipment owned by foreign affiliates in all 
sectors. FDI stocks are normalized by the gross state product (GSP) to make the indicator 
independent of the absolute sizes of the states. The density of FDI stocks is the FDI indicator 
used most frequently in the literature (e.g., Leichenko and Erickson 1997; Bobonis and Shatz 
2007). The second indicator, subsequently labeled “density of FDI employment”, emphasizes 
the real dimension of FDI, given by the number of employees working full-time or part-time 
                                                 
16 The results do not change much, however, if we define the FDI subsamples from average FDI densities over 
the whole period under study, 1977 – 2005.   10
in foreign affiliates in all sectors. FDI employment is normalized by the total employment in 
the respective state.
17  
We consider two alternative indicators of FDI density to take into account that the effects of 
FDI on the income distribution may depend on measurement. Keller and Yeaple (2009) argue 
that mismeasurement of FDI-related economic activity will bias the estimated FDI impact 
downwards. Measurement problems may concern FDI stocks in the first place, even though 
FDI stocks have been used extensively in the empirical literature on FDI effects. Relating to 
gross book values on a historical cost basis, they may be a flawed indicator of FDI-related 
activities such as production, sales, value added or employment that may promote economic 
growth in the host economy.
18 
And indeed, Figure 1 provides first indications that measurement matters for inward FDI in 
the US. The distribution of FDI across US states differs considerably between the two meas-
ures of FDI density. Only ten states, including the two Carolinas, Tennessee, Georgia and 
Louisiana in the south, Maine, Delaware, and West Virginia in the northeast, as well as 
Hawaii and Alaska are classified as having a high density in terms of both FDI stocks (Figure 
1.a) and FDI employment (Figure 1.b).
19 The states located in a belt ranging from Wyoming 
and North Dakota in the north to Arizona in the south feature a high density in terms of FDI 
stocks but not in terms of FDI employment. By contrast, most of the New England states fea-
ture a high density in terms of FDI employment but not in terms of FDI stocks.  
In addition to the quantitative measures of FDI density, qualitative or structural characteristics 
of FDI may impact significantly on its growth effects. Ideally, the quality of FDI would be 
captured by the degree to which FDI-related productivity effects spill over to local companies. 
Spillovers tend to be more pronounced if (backward and forward) linkages between foreign 
and local companies are relatively strong, and the fluctuation of workers is relatively high.
20 
However, the data required for assessing the scope of such interactions between foreign- and 
domestically-owned firms in US states are not available. Therefore, we turn to two structural 
characteristics of FDI that may indicate the potential of spillovers at least tentatively, namely 
the sectoral affiliation of foreign-owned firms and the employment intensity of FDI.  
                                                 
17 All FDI-related data are available from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA; http://www.bea.gov/). 
The data on gross state product (GSP) are also available from BEA. The data on employment by states are 
available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/). 
18 There is at least some empirical evidence suggesting that FDI is not properly measured by stock data. Mayer-
Foulkes and Nunnenkamp (2009) employ various measures of outward US FDI, including FDI stocks and 
employment of US affiliates, in a large number of host countries. They find that the growth effects of FDI tend 
to be understated, compared to almost all alternative measures of FDI, when using stock data. By contrast, the 
growth effects turn out to be particularly strong when using the employment data of affiliates. 
19 The results presented in this paper do not change notably if Alaska, Hawaii and Washington, DC, are excluded 
from the analysis (see the Appendix). 
20 For example, an intensive use of local inputs by foreign-owned firms is widely expected to trigger 
technological and knowledge spillovers. The fluctuation of workers may benefit the local economy through 
human-capital externalities.   11
Figure 1: FDI densities in US states, 1977–1986 
a. density of FDI stocks  b. density of FDI employment 
   
  low FDI density (17 states) 
  medium FDI density (17 states) 
  high FDI density (17 states) 
 
The sectoral affiliation matters to the extent that the potential for productivity-enhancing 
spillovers differs across sectors. FDI-related transfers of technology and knowledge are fre-
quently held to primarily occur in the manufacturing sector (e.g., Alfaro 2003). In contrast to 
the primary and tertiary sectors, the manufacturing sector is supposed to have a “broad range 
of linkage-intensive activities” (UNCTAD 2001, p. 138). This may create positive external-
ities and allow local producers to draw on a larger variety of inputs and, thereby, increase 
their productivity (Rodriguez-Clare 1996).
21 Hence, we consider the ratio of manufacturing to 
nonmanufacturing FDI (“manufacturing-nonmanufacturing ratio” for short), to be the first 
qualitative characteristic of FDI. We investigate whether US states with a higher manufactur-
ing-nonmanufacturing ratio have a higher probability of staying or becoming rich. More pre-
cisely, this ratio relates FDI stocks (or FDI employment) in the manufacturing sector to FDI 
stocks (or FDI employment) in all other sectors (total economy minus manufacturing). This 
ratio is standardized by the contemporary national manufacturing-nonmanufacturing ratio, 
logged, and calculated as the average for the period 1977 – 1986. 
The employment intensity of FDI matters to the extent that, compared to physical-capital-
intensive FDI, labor- and human-capital-intensive FDI may have stronger productivity effects 
on the local economies by offering benefits from labor pooling and human-capital external-
ities. Hence, we consider the ratio of FDI stocks and FDI employment (“capital-labor ratio” 
                                                 
21 Aykut and Sayek (2007) suspect that technology and knowledge spillovers in manufacturing are most likely if 
FDI is motivated by efficiency-seeking reasons.   12
for short) to be the second qualitative characteristic of FDI. Again, this ratio is standardized 
by the contemporary national capital-labor ratio, logged, and averaged over the period 1977 – 
1986.  
Figure 2 depicts the assignment of the 51 US states to the respective two subsamples when 
considering below and above average values of the qualitative characteristics just described. 
The ratios of manufacturing to nonmanufacturing FDI (map a in terms of FDI stocks, and map 
b in terms of FDI employment), as well as the capital-labor ratio (map c) exhibit a clear-cut 
east-west divide. Foreign-owned firms tend to be more employment-intensive and more con-
centrated in manufacturing industries in most of the eastern states. This indicates that FDI in 
the manufacturing sector tends to be more employment-intensive than FDI in other sectors. 
This would explain that FDI has a high capital-labor ratio in states such as Alaska where for-
eign firms are predominantly engaged in resource-extracting industries. More surprisingly, the 
employment intensity of FDI is also low in states such as Hawaii and Florida where FDI in 
services related to tourism figures prominently. Figure 2 also indicates that the ratio of manu-
facturing to nonmanufacturing FDI hardly depends on whether it is measured in terms of FDI 
stocks or FDI employment (maps a and b). In the following, we will therefore use only the 
ratio in terms of FDI employment for investigating the income effects of the sectoral pattern 
of FDI.  
The relative impact of the two qualitative characteristics of FDI on income can be investi-
gated in the framework used here by further dividing the subsamples of states with differing 
FDI densities. Specifically, we divide the subsamples of states with low and high FDI densi-
ties further into states with a low and a high manufacturing to nonmanufacturing ratio, or 
capital-labor ratio of FDI. Using the density of FDI stocks and the capital-labor ratio as an 
example, this results in four subsamples:  
1. states with a below-average density of FDI stocks and a below-average capital-labor ratio; 
2. states with a below-average density of FDI stocks and an above-average capital-labor ratio; 
3. states with an above-average density of FDI stocks and a below-average capital-labor ratio; 
4. states with an above-average density of FDI stocks and an above-average capital-labor 
ratio. 
Similar subsamples are defined for the density of FDI employment, and for the ratio of FDI in 
manufacturing to FDI in nonmanufacturing. We prefer dividing the entire sample into only 
two (rather than three) subsamples for the FDI density in this step of the analysis to econo-
mize on the number of transition probabilities to be estimated.    13
Figure 2:  Manufacturing-nonmanufacturing ratios and capital-labor ratios of FDI in US 
states, 1977–1986 
a. manufacturing-nonmanufacturing ratio of FDI (stocks) b. manufacturing-nonmanufacturing ratio of FDI 
(employment) 
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4  RESULTS 
4.1  FDI Density and Per-capita Income 
To put the subsequent analysis of the effects of inward FDI on the evolution of the per-capita 
income distribution among the US states into perspective, Table 1 depicts the (6x6) Mark-
ovian transition matrix, Π in equation (1), for the entire sample of 1,428 observations (28 
annual transitions 1977 – 2004 in the 51 US states). Table 1 also depicts the initial distribu-
tion,  h(t) in equation (2), in terms of absolute and relative frequencies (columns labeled 
“initial distribution”), as well as the limiting distribution the Markov chain converges to (h* 
in equation 3; row labeled “limiting”).  
The initial distribution is uniform by construction. Comparing the limiting to the initial distri-
bution indicates that there has been a rather weak income convergence across the US states 
during the last about three decades: The limiting distribution shows somewhat higher prob-
abilities in the middle income classes, and somewhat lower probabilities in the extreme 
classes 1 and 6. This result is perfectly in line with earlier results reported by Rey (2001), and 
Bickenbach and Bode (2003), among others.  
Yet the limiting distribution differs only modestly from the initial distribution, which indi-
cates that the income distribution across US states is already fairly close to its steady state. 
The estimated transition matrix offers more detailed insights into the mechanics of this con-
vergence process. It shows that states with below-average income levels (classes 1 – 3) face a 
somewhat higher probability of moving up the income ladder than of moving down the in-
come ladder. The opposite is true for states with relatively high income levels (classes 4 – 6).  
Table 1 –  Evolution of the income distribution across the 51 US states, 1977–2005 
initial distribution  final distribution 
PCPI class 
N  %  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1  238  0.167  0.891 0.105 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2  238  0.167  0.105 0.811 0.080 0.004 0.000 0.000 
3  238  0.167  0.004 0.063 0.828 0.105 0.000 0.000 
4  238  0.167  0.000 0.000 0.097 0.824 0.080 0.000 
5  238  0.167  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.084 0.866 0.050 
6  238  0.167  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.067 0.933 
limiting  1428  1.000  0.140 0.138 0.181 0.203 0.193 0.145   15
Density of FDI Stocks 
The transition matrices estimated for the three subsamples of US states with low, medium, 
and high densities of FDI stocks are given in Table 2. The LR test of the hypothesis that these 
three transition matrices are equal to each other is clearly rejected at an error probability of 
virtually zero (LR = 57.0; 26 degrees of freedom).
22 The limiting distributions indicate that 
states with a low density of FDI stocks will tend to be richer in the long run than states with a 
high density of FDI stocks. The probability of ending up in one of the two highest income 
classes, 5 and 6, is estimated to be 0.438 (0.078 + 0.360; first, upper panel of Table 2) for 
states with a low density of FDI stocks, but only 0.129 (0.081 + 0.038; third, lowest panel of 
Table 2) for states with a high density of FDI stocks. Correspondingly, the probability of 
ending up in one of the three below-average income classes is only 0.35 for states with a low 
density of FDI stocks, but 0.8 for states with a high density of FDI stocks.  
The initial distributions indicate that the states with a low density of FDI stocks were, on 
average, already richer from the start. The probability of starting from one of the two highest 
income classes is 0.323 (0.086 + 0.237; first panel of Table 2) for states with a low density of 
FDI stocks, but only 0.174 (0.09 + 0.084; third panel) for states with a high density of FDI 
stocks. However, the initial income gap is smaller than the gap in the limiting distribution. 
This indicates that states with lower density of FDI stocks have more favorable growth pros-
pects than states with higher density of FDI stocks, even though the former are already richer 
to start with. We infer from this that FDI, if measured in terms of stocks, did not go along 
with faster overall income convergence among all US states during the last about three 
decades. If anything, FDI has been associated with less income convergence.  
As noted in Section 3, caution is required with respect to causal inferences. States with lower 
income or less favorable growth prospects may have attracted higher FDI stocks. Arguably, 
higher FDI stocks may even have helped prevent still weaker income growth in states with 
unfavorable growth prospects to start with.
23 Robustness checks, discussed in the appendix, 
yield little evidence of reverse causality, however.  
Density of FDI Employment 
The transition matrices estimated for the three subsamples of US states with low, medium, 
and high densities of FDI employment are given in Table 3, which has the same shape as 
Table 2. The LR test rejects the hypothesis that these three transition matrices are equal to 
                                                 
22  Robustness checks for various different numbers of PCPI classes and various different numbers of FDI density 
subsamples indicate that this result does not depend on the way we discretize income and FDI density. Table 
Table A1 in the appendix shows that the LR test of equality of the transition matrices for specific subsamples is 
not rejected at the 5% level for only one out of 36 specifications. 
23 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this alternative interpretation.   16
each other at an error probability of only 6.4% (LR = 37.8; 26 degrees of freedom), thus 
slightly exceeding the conventional 5% threshold. Robustness checks for various specifica 
tions with different numbers of PCPI classes and FDI subsamples yield, however, error prob-
abilities far below 5% (see lower panel of Table A1 in the appendix).
24 We conclude from 
these checks that the income dynamics differ significantly between US states with different 
densities of FDI employment.  
Table 2:  Evolution of the income distribution across the 51 US states, 1977–2005, by the 
density of FDI stocks 
initial distribution  final distribution 
PCPI class 
N  %  1 2 3 4 5 6 
low density of FDI stocks 1977–1986 (<= –0.4305) 
1  48  0.101  0.875 0.125 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2  40  0.084  0.150 0.700 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.000 
3  124  0.261  0.000 0.040 0.847 0.113 0.000 0.000 
4  110  0.231  0.000 0.000 0.118 0.809 0.073 0.000 
5  41  0.086  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.195 0.683 0.122 
6  113  0.237  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.973 
limiting  476  1.000  0.071 0.059 0.220 0.210 0.078 0.360 
medium density of FDI stocks 1977–1986 (<= 0.12199) 
1  79  0.166  0.924 0.076 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2  42  0.088  0.143 0.833 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.000 
3  18  0.038  0.000 0.000 0.833 0.167 0.000 0.000 
4  98  0.206  0.000 0.000 0.020 0.888 0.092 0.000 
5  154  0.324  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.058 0.916 0.026 
6  85  0.179  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.082 0.918 
limiting  476  1.000  0.000 0.000 0.038 0.314 0.493 0.155 
high density of FDI stocks 1977–1986 (> 0.12199) 
1  111  0.233  0.874 0.117 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2  156  0.328  0.083 0.833 0.077 0.006 0.000 0.000 
3  96  0.202  0.010 0.104 0.802 0.083 0.000 0.000 
4  30  0.063  0.000 0.000 0.267 0.667 0.067 0.000 
5  43  0.090  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.070 0.860 0.070 
6  40  0.084  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.150 0.850 
limiting  476  1.000  0.230 0.317 0.249 0.085 0.081 0.038 
                                                 
24 The error probabilities are larger than 5% for only five of the 36 specifications checked in the appendix. See 
the lower panel of Table A1.    17
Table 3:  Evolution of the income distribution across the 51 US states, 1977–2005, by the 
density of FDI employment 
initial distribution  final distribution 
PCPI class 
N  %  1 2 3 4 5 6 
low density of FDI employment 1977–1986 (<= –0.35044) 
1  92  0.193  0.848 0.141 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2  90  0.189  0.156 0.744 0.089 0.011 0.000 0.000 
3  115  0.242  0.009 0.070 0.809 0.113 0.000 0.000 
4  65  0.137  0.000 0.000 0.215 0.677 0.108 0.000 
5  73  0.153  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.110 0.877 0.014 
6  41  0.086  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.073 0.927 
limiting  476  1.000  0.209 0.190 0.271 0.152 0.150 0.028 
medium density of FDI employment 1977–1986 (<= 0.06721) 
1  79  0.166  0.937 0.063 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2  54  0.113  0.093 0.852 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.000 
3  55  0.116  0.000 0.073 0.800 0.127 0.000 0.000 
4  112  0.235  0.000 0.000 0.054 0.875 0.071 0.000 
5  104  0.218  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.077 0.885 0.038 
6  72  0.151  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.069 0.931 
limiting  476  1.000  0.191 0.131 0.100 0.237 0.220 0.122 
high density of FDI employment 1977–1986 (> 0.06721) 
1  67  0.141  0.896 0.104 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2  94  0.197  0.064 0.851 0.085 0.000 0.000 0.000 
3  68  0.143  0.000 0.044 0.882 0.074 0.000 0.000 
4  61  0.128  0.000 0.000 0.049 0.885 0.066 0.000 
5  61  0.128  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.066 0.820 0.115 
6  125  0.263  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.064 0.936 
limiting  476  1.000  0.042 0.069 0.133 0.199 0.199 0.357 
 
The estimated relationship between FDI and income dynamics virtually turns into its opposite 
if the FDI density is measured in terms of employment shares of foreign affiliates rather than 
in terms of FDI stocks. The limiting distributions now indicate that states with a low density 
of FDI tend to be poorer in the long run than states with a high density of FDI. The probabil-
ity of ending up in one of the three below-average income classes, 1 – 3, is estimated to about 
two third (0.674 = 0.209 + 0.190 + 0.271) for states with a low FDI employment density, but 
only about one fourth (0.244 = 0.042 + 0.069 + 0.133) for states with a high FDI employment 
density. And the initial distributions now indicate that the states with a higher FDI density 
were, on average, already richer from the start. The probability of starting from one of the two   18
highest income classes is 0.391 (0.128 + 0.263; third panel of Table 3) for states with a high 
FDI employment density but only 0.239 (0.153 + 0.086; first panel) for states with a low FDI 
employment density. Moreover, the gaps between initial and limiting income distributions 
now indicate that states with higher FDI density have more favorable growth prospects than 
states with higher FDI density.
25 These striking differences corroborate Keller and Yeaple’s 
(2009) point that measurement of FDI makes a big difference. As mentioned in Section 3, 
measurement problems may concern FDI stocks in the first place. It can thus not be ruled out 
that the results based on FDI stocks (Table 2) are biased downwards, similar to what Mayer-
Foulkes and Nunnenkamp (2009) find for outward FDI by the US in a large number of host 
countries. Another possibility is that the income and growth effects of FDI depend crucially 
on qualitative characteristics of FDI, notably on whether FDI is physical capital-intensive or 
employment-intensive. This possibility is explored in the subsequent section. 
In spite of these differences, the two indicators of FDI yield similar results in terms of the 
relationship between FDI and income convergence. Similar to Table 2, Table 3 reveals that 
the initial income gap between states with low and high FDI density is smaller than the gap in 
the limiting distribution. We infer from this that FDI, irrespective of whether it is measured in 
terms of stocks or employment, has been associated with weaker, rather than stronger, overall 
income convergence among all US states.  
 
4.2  Qualitative Characteristics of FDI and Per-capita Income 
Capital-labor Ratio of FDI 
As discussed in Section 3, employment-intensive FDI may offer more favorable prospects for 
becoming or staying rich in the long-run, and for growing faster in the short and medium run 
than capital-intensive FDI. We use the aggregate capital-labor ratio of FDI in the US states to 
explore the importance of this qualitative characteristic of FDI. To this end, the subsamples of 
states with differing densities of FDI employment are further divided into subsamples of 
states with a below-average and an above-average capital-labor ratio of FDI. As noted in 
Section 3, we reduce the number of subsamples in terms of the density of FDI employment 
from three to two to be able to estimate the transition probabilities with a greater precision. 
For the same reason, we reduce the number of income classes from six to four. To save space, 
we will henceforth present only the initial and the limiting distributions of the estimated 
Markov chains in graphical terms.  
Figure 3 depicts the initial and limiting distributions for the entire sample divided into four 
income classes (graph 0), and the corresponding distributions for the subsamples with low 
                                                 
25 Robustness checks, discussed in the appendix, yield again little evidence of reverse causality.   19
densities of FDI employment (graphs a and b) and high densities of FDI employment (graphs 
c and d). Graphs a and c depict the distributions for states with below-average capital-labor 
ratios, graphs b and d those for states with above-average ratios. The distributions for the 
entire sample in graph 0 largely reproduce the main result of Table 1, namely that there has 
been a weak tendency towards income convergence across all US states. The estimated tran-
sition matrix for the subsample of states with a low density of FDI employment and a below-
average capital-labor ratio (graph a) is non-ergodic (reducible). Consequently, a limiting dis-
tribution cannot be determined. This does, however, not invalidate the LR test of equality of 
all transition matrices. 
The LR test of the hypothesis that all four transition matrices for the combinations of FDI 
densities and capital-labor ratios are equal to each other is clearly rejected at an error prob-
ability of virtually zero (LR = 74; 18 degrees of freedom). This error probability is signifi-
cantly lower than the error probability of the test comparing only the subsamples for different 
densities of FDI employment (6.4%; see Section 4.1). This suggests that the capital-labor ratio 
of FDI contributes some additional heterogeneity to the heterogeneity between states with low 
and high densities of FDI employment.  
The limiting distributions for the three subsamples in graphs b – d indicate that the positive 
association of a high FDI density with the long-run income and growth prospects of states 
results mainly from employment-intensive FDI. By contrast, states with a high density of 
capital-intensive FDI (graph d) are even estimated to have slightly less favorable income and 
growth prospects than states with a low density of capital-intensive FDI (graph b). States with 
a high density of capital-intensive FDI face a higher probability of ending up in one of the two 
below-average income classes, 1 and 2, than states with a low density of capital-intensive FDI 
(0.605 versus 0.56). This implies that a high FDI density, in terms of the employment share of 
foreign-owned firms, is not sufficient for having particularly favorable long-run income and 
growth prospects. It is rather the combination of a high FDI density and a high employment 
intensity of foreign-owned firms that is associated with higher income and faster growth.  
A comparison of the initial and the limiting distributions provides several insights. First, the 
income divergence of states with a high FDI density is driven only by states with a high 
employment intensity of FDI (graph c), which have the most favorable long-run income and 
growth prospects. Second, states with a high FDI density and a high capital intensity of FDI 
(graph d) have been falling back in the income distribution. While they had a fair chance of 
about one third (0.327) to be rich in the initial distribution, this chance drops to one sixth 
(0.167) in the limiting distribution.
26  
                                                 
26  Broadly similar patterns emerge if FDI stocks, instead of FDI employment, are used as an indicator of the FDI 
density: The long-run income and growth prospects are most favorable for states with a low density of FDI 
stocks and a high employment intensity of FDI, and least favorable for states with a high density of FDI stocks 
and a high capital intensity of FDI.   20
Figure 3: Evolution of the income distribution across the 51 US states, 1977–2005, by the 
density of FDI employment and the capital-labor ratio of FDI — initial and limiting 
distributions 
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a  The limiting distribution does not exist because the Markov chain is not ergodic. The transition probabilities 
from and to the first, lowest income class are estimated to be zero. 
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Sectoral Composition of FDI 
Next we assess the importance of our second qualitative characteristic of FDI, the sectoral 
pattern of FDI, for the states’ long-run income and growth prospects. The discussion in 
Section 3 suggests that FDI in the manufacturing sector fosters income and growth to a 
greater extent than FDI in mining or the service sector. The probabilities of being rich in the 
long run should then be higher for the two subsamples with an above-average ratio of manu-
facturing to nonmanufacturing FDI (in terms of FDI employment).  
Similar to Figure 3, Figure 4 depicts the initial and limiting distributions for the four subsam-
ples divided simultaneously by the density of FDI employment and the manufacturing-non-
manufacturing ratio. The corresponding distributions for the entire sample are the same as 
those depicted in graph 0 of Figure 3. 
The LR test of the hypothesis that all four transition matrices for the combinations of the den-
sities and sectoral patterns of FDI are equal to each other is clearly rejected at an error prob-
ability of virtually zero (LR = 42.4; 18 degrees of freedom). Again, this error probability is 
significantly lower than the error probability of the test comparing only the subsamples for 
different densities of FDI employment. Similar to the capital-labor ratio, the sectoral pattern 
of FDI appears to contribute some additional heterogeneity. However, additional tests not 
reported here indicate that the sectoral composition of FDI does not impact significantly on 
the income prospects of the states, if the differences in the FDI densities are not controlled for 
explicitly. In other words, the association of the sectoral pattern of FDI with the states’ 
income and growth prospects is weak, compared to that of the density of FDI. 
This conclusion is corroborated by the limiting and initial distributions depicted in Figure 4. 
They largely reproduce the result obtained for the density of FDI employment alone in the 
preceding section: A higher density of FDI employment goes along with better income and 
growth prospects. This result holds irrespective of the sectoral pattern of FDI. For a given 
density of FDI employment, a concentration of FDI on nonmanufacturing sectors (lower 
manufacturing-nonmanufacturing ratio; graphs a and c) appears to be associated with more 
favorable income prospects than a concentration of FDI on the manufacturing sector. This 
result conflicts with the view that FDI in manufacturing is most likely to enhance the produc-
tivity of local firms through economic spillovers. However, the robustness of this result is 
open to debate, as is shown in the appendix.
27 More substantive conclusions could be 
                                                 
27  The finding that a higher density of FDI employment goes along with better the long-run income and growth 
prospects of US states can be shown to hold when separate estimations are performed for each of the two 
sectors (manufacturing and nonmanufacturing). The detailed results are available from the authors upon 
request.   22
expected from an analysis based on more disaggregated (industry-specific) FDI data, which 
are not available at the state level, however. 
Figure 4: Evolution of the income distribution across the 51 US states, 1977–2005, by the 
density of FDI employment and the manufacturing-nonmanufacturing ratio of FDI 
— initial and limiting distributions 
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5  CONCLUSION 
It is by various measures that the US represents the world’s most attractive host country of 
FDI. It is the country with the largest inward FDI stocks and also the most favored location 
for affiliates of the top 100 multinational companies. Nevertheless, the economic impact of 
FDI in the US, and particularly its regional income and growth implications, has received 
only scant attention in the empirical literature. This is still more surprising in the light of the 
fierce competition for FDI among US states, which Glickman and Woodward (1989) dis-
missed as a “mad scramble for the crumbs” almost 20 years ago. 
Our analysis contrasts sharply with such generalized verdicts. Applying a Markov chain 
approach and measuring FDI by our preferred measure, the employment share of foreign-
owned firms, we find that states with a higher FDI density have a significantly greater chance   23
of being rich in the long run. Yet FDI appears to be associated with weaker rather than 
stronger income convergence among US states. States with a higher density of FDI employ-
ment, which were, on average, already richer from the start, have diverged from the national 
average towards even higher income levels. 
The finding that FDI is associated with less convergence among US states also holds when 
using FDI stocks as a measure of the density of FDI. However, states with a higher density of 
FDI stocks, which were, on average, already poorer from the start, have a significantly greater 
chance of being poor in the long run, and have diverged from the national average towards 
even lower income levels. This contrasting finding for the two different quantitative indicators 
of FDI corroborates Keller and Yeaple (2009) who argue that measurement of FDI makes a 
big difference. Especially in capital-abundant countries like the US, capital transfers through 
FDI may play a minor role for generating growth-enhancing economies of agglomeration 
among foreign-owned and local firms, compared to employment-related spillovers of human 
capital and knowledge. 
Qualitative characteristics of FDI offer additional insights to this effect. In contrast to capital-
intensive FDI, employment-intensive FDI has been positively associated with per-capita 
income growth during the last about three decades, and went along with a higher probability 
that the host state will be rich in the long run. It appears that employment-intensive FDI offers 
a greater potential for positive economies of agglomeration like labor pooling, knowledge 
spillovers, or human-capital externalities among foreign-owned firms and the local economy.  
The sectoral composition of FDI is shown to be less important than the employment intensity. 
We find no compelling evidence supporting the view that FDI in the manufacturing sector is 
superior to FDI in other sectors. One possible explanation is that growth-enhancing spillovers 
and other agglomeration externalities are as strong in the services sector as they are supposed 
to be in the manufacturing sector. Another explanation is that efficiency-seeking FDI in the 
manufacturing sector, i.e., the type of FDI that Aykut and Sayek (2007) suspect to have par-
ticularly strong technology and knowledge spillovers, does not play a major role in the US. 
More detailed data would be required to assess the extent to which specific types of FDI, with 
different factor intensities and in different industries, generate positive agglomeration econo-
mies.  
Our major findings are fairly robust to variations in the empirical setup. This invites two ten-
tative policy conclusions. First, policymakers appear to be most interested in attracting FDI in 
the manufacturing sector, while they are often reluctant to accept foreign competition in ser-
vices industries. According to our results, this form of selective treatment of inward FDI is not 
warranted. Second, the preference of policymakers for FDI that generates employment, rather 
than only adding to the local capital stock, appears reasonable. Indeed, the evidence for US 
states suggests that the benefits to be derived from employment-intensive FDI go beyond the 
first-round employment generation that policymakers typically have in mind.   24
Some caveats have to be kept in mind, however. Most obviously, it does not only depend on 
the benefits that a specific type of FDI is likely to deliver whether it makes economic sense to 
compete for inward FDI; it also depends on the costs involved in terms of foregone govern-
ment revenues and outright subsidies. It remains to be seen whether the approach of Green-
stone and Moretti (2004) can be transferred to specifically FDI-related contexts. This 
approach considers property values in the host region to reflect the net welfare effects of plant 
location, assuming that both the benefits and costs of luring a plant to a particular region enter 
into the price of land. Moreover, the present analysis invites further research in various other 
respects. The importance of measurement suggests considering additional dimensions of FDI 
such as production, sales and exports, in order to substantiate the point that FDI stocks may 
provide a misleading picture on the economic effects of FDI. Similarly, it would be desirable 
to account for other aspects of the heterogeneity of FDI. For instance, the investment and 
growth effects of greenfield FDI may differ from those of M&As (Wang and Wong 2009). 
Additional insights may be gained by differentiating market-seeking, efficiency-seeking and 
strategic-asset-seeking FDI, as well as FDI from different sources. However, accounting for 
FDI heterogeneity in these respects is subject to serious data constraints at the level of US 
states. 
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APPENDIX: ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
This appendix investigates the robustness of the main results presented in Section 4 to the 
choices of the class and subsample bounds; to endogeneity of FDI densities with respect to 
income levels; to a violation of the assumptions of time homogeneity and time independence 
underlying the Markovian approach; and to including the non-contiguous states of Alaska and 
Hawaii as well as Washington, DC.  
Class and subsample definitions 
The inferences drawn from a Markov analysis are usually rather sensitive to the choices of the 
number of income classes and the location of the bounds between those classes (Magrini 
2004). In addition, the inferences may be sensitive to the choice of the bounds between the 
subsamples. In fact, Figure A1 shows that the densities of FDI stocks or employment of 
several states are fairly close to the subsample bounds. For example, there is a concentration 
of states (consecutive numbers 15 – 20) at the boundary between low and medium density of 
FDI stocks. A slightly lower or higher boundary between these two subsamples may affect 
our results notably because it would shift several states to a different subsample. 
Figure A1: Distribution of FDI stocks and employment densities across the 51 US states, 
average FDI densities over 1977–1986
a 
a Horizontal lines indicate the boundaries between the respective three subsamples of low, medium and high FDI 
densities. See Section 3 for the detailed definitions of FDI stocks and employment densities.   26
One way of reducing the arbitrariness of the choice of the bounds between the income classes 
would be using one of the formal criteria for determining the optimal number of classes pro-
posed in the literature (Magrini 1999; Bulli 2001). These formal criteria are not used here 
because they usually suggest the optimum number of classes to be very high relative to the 
number of observations. The resulting high number of transition probabilities of the transition 
matrix for the entire sample could be estimated only imprecisely; this would apply still more 
so to the transition probabilities of the transition matrices for the subsamples. Another way of 
reducing arbitrary choices of the class bounds would be estimating continuous Markov chains 
(Quah 1997). This approach is not followed here because the number of observations is rather 
small in some of the subsamples for differing FDI densities, and because a statistical test for 
comparing the continuous transition processes across the subsamples is, to the best of our 
knowledge, not available.  
Instead, we perform a series of additional estimations to investigate the robustness of our 
main results to the choice of the number of income classes and subsamples and, thus, to the 
location of the bounds between these classes and subsamples. Table A1 presents the results 
for estimations with 3 – 7 income classes and 3 – 7 subsamples of FDI density (employment 
or stocks). To save space, Table A1 reports only the error probabilities of the LR tests of 
equality of the transition matrices across the FDI subsamples. The tests for FDI stocks in the 
upper panel of Table A1 show that the results on the relationship between FDI and income 
reported in Section 4.1 are very robust against variations in the numbers of income classes or 
subsamples. The LR tests reject the hypothesis that the FDI stock density is irrelevant for the 
evolution of the income distribution among US states for 35 of the 36 specifications with dif-
ferent numbers of FDI subsamples and income classes. The respective sets of transition matri-
ces and limiting distributions, which are not reported here for the sake of brevity, show simi-
lar patterns as those in Table 2: States with a higher density of FDI stocks have a lower prob-
ability of being rich in the long run.  
The LR tests in the lower panel of Table A1 reject the hypothesis that FDI employment den-
sity is irrelevant for the evolution of the income distribution among US states for 31 of the 36 
specifications with different numbers of FDI subsamples and income classes. One of the five 
“outliers” for which the error probability is above 5% is our baseline specification with three 
FDI subsamples and six income classes reported in Table 3. We infer from this that density of 
FDI employment makes a difference for the long-term growth prospects of US states. States 
with a higher density of FDI employment have a higher probability of being rich in the long 
run.  
Likewise, the effects of the capital-labor ratio of FDI on the income distribution investigated 
in the first part of Section 4.2 are fairly robust against variations in the number of both income 
classes and subsamples (not shown here in detail). Only the effects of the sectoral composi-
tion of FDI investigated in the second part of Section 4.2 are somewhat sensitive to a variation   27
in the number of subsamples. Some tests indicate that the sectoral composition may impact in 
a more complex way on the income and growth prospects of states with a high FDI density 
than suggested by the results in Section 4.2. More detailed information on the sectoral pat-
terns of FDI is warranted to substantiate these results.  
Table A1: Evolution of the per-capita income distribution across the 51 US states, 1977–2003, 
by initial densities of FDI stocks or employment 1997–1986: Probability values of 
LR tests on equality of Markov transition matrices across subsamples for different 
numbers of income classes and FDI subsamples 
Number of FDI subsamples …  Number of PCPI 
classes  2 3 4 5 6 7 
  … by density of FDI stocks 
2  0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
3  0.020 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.001 0.000 
4  0.039 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5  0.005 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
6  0.089 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
7  0.045 0.001 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 
  … by density of FDI employment 
2  0.020 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.008 
3  0.006 0.302 0.004 0.331 0.000 0.020 
4  0.006 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5  0.014 0.004 0.019 0.001 0.000 0.000 
6  0.069 0.064 0.015 0.070 0.000 0.002 
7  0.002 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Endogeneity of FDI density 
While the Markovian analysis performed in this paper does, in general, not support causal 
inferences, it may raise endogeneity concerns insofar as the states’ FDI densities may depend 
on these states’ income levels. Indeed, there is a large literature on host-economy characteris-
tics as major determinants of (particular types of) FDI. For instance, Lee and Mansfield 
(1996) have shown that the volume and composition of FDI by US based investors depend on 
the protection of property rights across various host countries. As concerns inward FDI in the 
US, Coughlin et al. (1991) find that foreign investors prefer, ceteris paribus, US states with 
higher per-capita income. 
Endogeneity concerns may arise from two aspects: the overlap between the time periods used 
for defining FDI subsamples and for estimating transition probabilities, and reverse causality. 
Both aspects will be addressed below in more detail.   28
The overlap between the time period used for defining FDI subsamples (1977 to 1986) and 
that used for estimating the Markovian transition probabilities (1977 to 2003) may result in 
biased assignments of states to FDI subsamples as well as to biased estimates of transition 
probabilities.
28 Assignments of states to FDI subsamples will be biased, if some states are 
assigned to the group of states with high FDI densities not because they had high FDI 
employment densities to start with but because their high income levels or prosperous income 
growth during the period 1977 to 1986 attracted large amounts of FDI.
29 In addition, inflows 
of FDI during the period 1977 to 1986 may bias the estimated transition probabilities upwards 
by their effects on income levels. Even if FDI has no causal impact on states’ long-run growth 
prospects, FDI inflows may increase per-capita income levels if they increase aggregate 
output and reduce unemployment.  
We address this endogeneity concern by avoiding any overlaps between the time period used 
to define FDI subsamples and that used to estimate the transition probabilities. Table A2 
summarizes, separately for FDI stocks (upper panel) and FDI employment (lower panel), the 
results of Markov chain estimations for different lengths of the time period used to define FDI 
subsamples (1  –  10 years). This time period, given in the first column of Table A2, is 
excluded from the time period used for estimating the transition probabilities. To save space, 
Table A2 reports only the results of the LR tests of equality of the transition matrices for three 
FDI subsamples and the probabilities in the tails (sums of the two lowest and the two highest 
income classes) of the limiting distributions for the subsamples of states with the lowest and 
the highest FDI density. The differences between the subsamples in terms of FDI stocks 
(upper panel of Table A2) lose somewhat in significance when the period used to define the 
FDI subsamples is very short or very long. We attribute these losses in significance to a trade 
off between the precision of the allocation of states to subsamples and the precision of the 
estimates of transition probabilities. The shorter the period used for defining subsamples, the 
stronger will be the influence of outliers on the definition of subsamples; and the longer this 
period, the lower the precision of the estimated transition probabilities due to a considerable 
loss of observations. Nevertheless, the limiting distributions corroborate the main results from 
our baseline specifications: States with lower initial densities of FDI stocks and higher initial 
densities of FDI employment tend to have a higher probability of being rich in the long run. 
                                                 
28 As discussed in Section 3, we prefer this overlap of ten years, which covers about one third of the entire 
sample period, in order to reduce the effects of short-term fluctuations in FDI densities on the classification of 
states. Moreover, we maximize the number of available transitions in this way in order to estimate the 
transition probabilities as reliably as possible. 
29 Likewise, some states may be assigned to the group of states with low FDI densities in our analysis because 
they lost FDI due to their low income levels or weak growth performances during the period 1977 to 1986.   29
Table A2: Evolution of the per-capita income distribution across the 51 US states, 1977–2003, 
by initial densities of FDI stocks or employment 1997–1986: Results for different 
lengths of time period for defining FDI subsamples
a 
Limiting distribution  Test of equality 
across 3 FDI 
subsamples 
Subsample  
low FDI density 
Subsample  
high FDI density 
Time period for 
definition of  
FDI subsamples 





 FDI  stocks 
1977  32.4  0.117  0.146 0.502  0.502 0.224 
1977–1978  51.7  0.001  0.150 0.476  0.372 0.280 
1977–1980  37.0  0.012  0.142 0.459  0.387 0.269 
1977–1982  38.2  0.008  0.082 0.655  0.428 0.143 
1977–1984  30.7  0.059  0.088 0.467  0.555 0.163 
1977–1986  29.5  0.079  0.117 0.367  0.366 0.231 
 FDI  employment 
1977  30.5  0.170  0.515 0.119  0.090 0.594 
1977–1978  27.6  0.277  0.530 0.132  0.097 0.567 
1977–1980  26.0  0.167  0.570 0.129  0.083 0.628 
1977–1982  19.0  0.519  0.410 0.222  0.119 0.512 
1977–1984  26.2  0.159  0.241 0.493  0.079 0.591 
1977–1986  21.8  0.352  0.156 0.575  0.148 0.447 
a The time periods used for defining FDI subsamples are excluded from those used to estimate the transition 
probabilities. 
b Sum of lowest income classes 1 and 2. 
c Sum of highest income classes 5 and 6.  
 
The second endogeneity concern is reverse causality. Our finding that states with high densi-
ties of employment-intensive FDI tend to be richer in the long run may partly be due to for-
eign investors systematically preferring states with higher per-capita income for their 
employment-intensive investments. Likewise, our finding that states with high densities of 
capital-intensive FDI tend to be poorer in the long run may partly be due to foreign investors 
systematically preferring states with lower per-capita income for their capital-intensive 
investments. If per-capita income levels were causal for FDI densities, we should observe a 
tendency towards concentration of capital-intensive FDI in poorer states in the long run, and a 
tendency towards concentration of employment-intensive FDI in richer states.
30  
We address this reverse causality by testing if there is a systematic concentration of FDI 
stocks in poorer states in the long run, or of FDI employment in richer states. For this pur-
pose, we simply interchange FDI density and per-capita income in our Markovian analysis. 
We define equally sized subsamples of states with different levels of per-capita income during 
                                                 
30 This kind of sorting could also be expected to occur, if per-capita income and FDI densities depended on each 
other and were determined jointly in the long-run equilibrium, or if they jointly depended on third, unobserved 
variables.   30
the period 1977 – 1986. We then estimate the evolution of FDI densities separately for each 
subsample by Markov chains with (between two and seven) FDI density classes, which are 
equally sized in the entire sample. We evaluate by means of an LR test if these evolutions 
differ between states with different initial per-capita income levels.
31 
 
Table A3:  Evolution of the distribution of densities of FDI stocks or employment across the 
51 US states, 1977–2003, by initial per-capita income, 1997–1986: Probability 
values of LR tests on equality of Markov transition matrices across income 
subsamples for different numbers of FDI classes and income subsamples 
Number of subsamples by per-capita income 1977–1986  Number of  
FDI classes  2  3  4 5 6  7 
  error probabilities of LR tests 
FDI  stocks           
2  0.086  0.558  0.004 0.488 0.125  0.005 
3  0.008  0.001  0.002 0.009 0.040  0.014 
4  0.039  0.068  0.008 0.295 0.170  0.007 
5  0.125  0.366  0.015 0.240 0.520  0.098 
6  0.032  0.024  0.036 0.406 0.233  0.166 
7  0.128  0.318  0.155 0.457 0.163  0.219 
FDI  employment           
2  0.975  0.821  0.954 0.587 0.861  0.315 
3  0.236  0.588  0.226 0.662 0.195  0.043 
4  0.003  0.085  0.017 0.240 0.010  0.389 
5  0.001  0.013  0.019 0.012 0.000  0.020 
6  0.418  0.531  0.334 0.352 0.062  0.689 
7  0.006  0.175  0.041 0.261 0.025  0.296 
 
Table A3, which has the same shape as Table A1, depicts the error probabilities of the LR 
tests of equality of the transition matrices obtained from estimations for varying numbers of 
income subsamples and FDI density classes. The relationship between initial per-capita 
income and the subsequent evolution of FDI density turns out to be much weaker than the 
reverse relationship between initial FDI density and the subsequent evolution of per-capita 
income (see Table A1) for both of our FDI indicators, FDI stocks (upper panel) and FDI 
employment (lower panel). The evolution of FDI stocks differs significantly (at the 5% level) 
between income subsamples in only 15 of the 36 specifications, and the evolution of FDI 
                                                 
31 Data availability limits the analysis of the evolutions of the densities of FDI stocks or employment to the 
period 1977 – 2003.   31
employment in only 13 of the 36 specifications.
32 Recall for comparison that the evolution of 
per-capita income differed significantly between FDI subsamples in almost all specifications.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that the evidence for reverse causality is rather weak - 
even though there is some concentration of poorer states among the states with high density of 
FDI stocks (see Table 2), and some concentration of richer states among the states with high 
density of FDI employment (see Table 3). All this does not rule out that states at a particular 
level of per-capita income attract particular types of FDI. Yet, we find at least tentative evi-
dence suggesting that causality may in fact run from FDI to per-capita income. 
Time homogeneity and independence  
Bickenbach and Bode (2003) emphasize that the Markovian approach rests on fairly restric-
tive assumptions. In particular, the transition probabilities are assumed to be constant over all 
transition periods (time homogeneity), and to be independent of the historical evolution of 
income, i.e., of the income levels at times before time t (time independence; or Markov prop-
erty).  
Applying the tests suggested in Bickenbach and Bode (2003), we could not reject the 
hypothesis that the Markov chain with six income classes is time-homogeneous over the sam-
ple period 1977–2004 (prob  =  0.28). We could, however, reject the hypothesis that this 
Markov chain is time-independent (prob  <  0.001). The usual procedure for retaining time 
independence is using longer transition periods (Bickenbach and Bode 2003). Therefore, we 
reestimated all transition matrices presented in Section 4 using biannual rather than annual 
transitions. The biannual transitions were calculated as changes of the (logged relative) per-
capita incomes from the average of times t and t+1 to the average of times t+2 and t+3. 
Indeed, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the Markov chain for the biannual transitions is 
time-independent (prob = 0.59). At the same time, the aggregation of two consecutive obser-
vations in time reduces the number of observed transitions by more than half.
33  
Yet the main results arising from these biannual transitions are very similar to those arising 
from the annual transitions presented in Section 4. Figure A2 exemplifies this similarity by 
comparing the initial and limiting distributions estimated from the annual (left-hand side 
graphs) and the biannual transitions (right-hand side graphs) for the income and growth 
effects of the density of FDI employment investigated in Section 4.1. The only notable differ-
                                                 
32 Furthermore, the limiting distributions of those specifications that yield significant differences between 
income subsamples do not support unambiguous inferences on reverse causality. The specification for six FDI 
stocks classes and three income subsamples is supportive of reverse causality. The probability of having a high 
density of FDI stocks in the long run (FDI classes 5 and 6) is higher for poor states (0.469) than for rich states 
(0.317). By contrast, the specification for six FDI stocks classes and four income subsamples is not supportive 
of reverse causality. Here, the probability of having a high density of FDI stocks in the long run (FDI classes 5 
and 6) is lower for poor states (0.441) than for rich states (0.493). 
33 The reason for presenting the time-dependent annual transitions in Section 4 is that the substantially larger 
number of observations facilitates more rigorous robustness tests.   32
ence is that the positive relationship between the higher density of FDI employment and the 
probability of being rich in the long run is even more pronounced for the biannual transitions. 
The tendency of the divergence of the low and high FDI density states into opposite directions 




Figure A2: Evolution of the income distribution across the 51 US states, 1977–2005, by the 
density of FDI employment — initial and limiting distributions for annual and 
biannual transition periods 
entire sample 
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Figure A2 continued 
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48 contiguous states 
Finally, all estimations reported so far are based on data for all 51 US states. By contrast, 
various regression analyses on the location choice of foreign investors within the US and on 
the effects of FDI focus on the 48 contiguous states; see, among others, Chung and Alcácer 
(2002), Leichenko and Erickson (1997), Crain and Lee (1999), Garofalo and Yamarik (2002), 
Mullen and Williams (2005), and Bobonis and Shatz (2007). The exclusion of Alaska, Hawaii 
and Washington, DC, is typically justified by the exceptional nature of FDI in these states. 
For instance, Bobonis and Shatz (2007) note that Alaska attracted “outsize investments during 
the entire period”, while Hawaii became an outlier in the 1990s. Moreover, the sectoral   34
structure of FDI appears to be exceptional in these states, with FDI in Alaska being concen-
trated in resource extraction and FDI in Hawaii being concentrated in tourism.  
Therefore, we investigated to what extent FDI located in Alaska, Hawaii and Washington, 
DC, affects the results reported in Section 4. We reestimated all transition matrices excluding 
these three states. The (unreported) estimations reveal that this modification does not affect 
the results to a notable extent. This finding is in line with Bobonis and Shatz (2007), whose 
regression results are robust to including the non-contiguous states.  
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